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Abstract: The increased connectivity to existing computer networks has exposed medical 
devices to cybersecurity vulnerabilities from which they were previously shielded. For the 
prevention of cybersecurity incidents, it is important to recognize the complexity of the opera-
tional environment as well as to catalog the technical vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity protection 
is not just a technical issue; it is a richer and more intricate problem to solve. A review of the 
factors that contribute to such a potentially insecure environment, together with the identification 
of the vulnerabilities, is important for understanding why these vulnerabilities persist and what 
the solution space should look like. This multifaceted problem must be viewed from a systemic 
perspective if adequate protection is to be put in place and patient safety concerns addressed. 
This requires technical controls, governance, resilience measures, consolidated reporting, con-
text expertise, regulation, and standards. It is evident that a coordinated, proactive approach to 
address this complex challenge is essential. In the interim, patient safety is under threat.
Keywords: cybersecurity, security, safety, wireless, risk, medical devices
Introduction
Recent technical advances have resulted in transformations in health care delivery, 
which have the capacity and capability to improve patient care. A prime example of this 
is the increase in interconnectivity between medical devices and other clinical systems. 
This interconnectivity leaves medical devices vulnerable to security breaches in the 
same way other networked computing systems are vulnerable. However, unlike other 
networked computing systems, there is an increasing concern that the connectivity of 
these medical devices will directly affect clinical care and patient safety.
The integration of medical devices, networking, software, and operating systems 
means that the relative isolation and safety of medical devices are challenged. With 
integration comes complexity and challenges in management and thus protection. 
These challenges are known collectively as cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The term 
cybersecurity is used to cover a broad spectrum of context specific adversarial 
challenges.1 “Cybersecurity entails the safeguarding of computer networks and the 
information they contain from penetration and from malicious damage or disruption”.2 
The inevitable crossover from standalone medical devices to integrated equipment, 
networks, and software is creating not only problems of management and protection, 
but also one of definition. In a world where medical devices require safety approval, 
this creates a multitude of previously non-existent problems.
Increasingly, health care is a prime target for cyberattack with a recent SANS 
Institute report reporting that 94% of health care organizations have been the victim 





of a cyberattack. This includes attacks on medical devices 
and infrastructure.3 Regulatory authorities, such as the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have responsibil-
ity for assuring the safety, effectiveness, and security of 
medical devices. The regulatory bodies have acknowledged 
the seriousness and enormity of the problem by publishing 
recommendations for managing cybersecurity risks and 
protecting patient health information, to assist manufac-
turers in their submissions for FDA approval of medical 
devices.4 While these are non-binding recommendations, 
they acknowledge that there has been a shift in the operating 
environment for medical devices, and that this shift needs 
urgent attention. Consequently, there is also debate over the 
definition of a medical device, and under what circumstances 
software is considered a medical device. The international 
standards community has taken a lead role in developing and 
modifying existing standards to address such issues. New and 
innovative models of health care are facilitated by the oppor-
tunity for interoperability, while supporting improvements in 
patient safety. However, the proprietary nature of previously 
non-interoperable medical devices has limited integration 
between vendors’ products, and can result in errors in com-
munication when integration is achieved.5 Integration does 
not equate to interoperability, and interoperability does not 
equate to security.
Over the past 4 years, there has been increasing confusion 
over the definition of what constitutes a medical device, arising 
from the FDA ruling that medical device regulation includes 
“software, electronic and electrical hardware, including wire-
less”, where this claims to be useful for medical purposes 
under the Medical Device Data System Rule.6 The problem 
is that this definition includes data storage and data transfer, 
which to date has not been a security focus for medical device 
manufacturers. In the demand for interoperability to support 
data exchange and collation of data sources to aid clinical 
decision-making, perhaps the subsidiary cybersecurity vulner-
abilities of this interoperability are a bigger problem than is 
currently manageable. These vulnerabilities are not confined 
to device characteristics and connectivity, and include technol-
ogy issues, software risks, and human factors.
The paper frames this complex problem in order 
to identify the vulnerabilities and methods of attack. 
The potential impact of security breaches are presented as a 
backdrop to the discourse on how these vulnerabilities occur 
from a systemic perspective. Rather than taking a purely 
technical view, the paper encapsulates the conceptual view 
of the complete environment of implementation of medical 
devices with respect to the cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 
Therefore, some of the content is necessarily general in nature 
with regard to cybersecurity. Consequently, a multifaceted 
approach to the solution space is presented, together with 
the challenges of creating this solution space. The paper 
concludes with the factors that may influence future medical 
device development with regard to the cybersecurity of 
medical devices.
Framing the problem
The problem of cybersecurity vulnerability associated with 
medical devices requires framing as it consists of multiple 
and disparate factors. These include the transfer from isolated 
devices to networked, and the tensions this creates between 
security and safety; why this is not just a technical problem; 
and the subsequent contention between regulation and 
manufacture. Examples of incidents are provided to highlight 
the diversity of the cybersecurity problem.
Definition of medical devices
The historically well-defined description of a medical device 
has evolved from unconnected equipment, through to wire-
lessly reprogrammable implantable devices, to software 
applications. Therefore, it is necessary to define what a 
medical device is in a networked and mobile world. This 
paper refers to medical devices as:
An instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, 
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, 
including a component part, or accessory […] intended for 
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease […]
As per the FDA definition.7 This definition is constrained 
to exclude broader consideration of health and wellness 
applications running on mobile devices. Further, with 
software increasingly embedded into medical devices, the 
shift to software as a medical device (SaMD) has inevitably 
occurred.
Well-developed and validated software has the potential to 
significantly and positively impact the delivery of patient 
care, transforming how we manage healthcare across the 
globe. Software is embedded in a medical device to assist 
in function and operation.8
Various interested parties and standards organizations are 
considering the implications of this change, and starting to 
address the fundamental design issues and safety concerns 
this raises. The current state of this fundamental variation in 
the concept of what constitutes a medical device is important 
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in the discussion of vulnerabilities. This ontology is more 
difficult to use when assessing cybersecurity risks in relation 
to device failures when the supporting network affected is 
not proximate to the device or the potential impact.
Tension between safety and security
Medical device information flow is conventionally unidirec-
tional from the device to the health care provider. However, as 
technology has advanced, remote interaction with devices has 
become possible, and contemporary devices are networked 
to monitoring systems and electronic medical record (EMR) 
systems. To understand the structure of the vulnerabilities 
that this connectivity creates, it is essential to appreciate that 
medical devices are no longer a stand-alone component of 
the clinical care process, and therefore are not afforded the 
protection against cybersecurity attack that was once provided 
by stand-alone segregation.
Implantable medical devices capable of being repro-
grammed wirelessly, such as pacemakers, drug (eg, insulin) 
pumps, defibrillators, and neuro-stimulators are used for 
monitoring and treating patients. The foundational study 
by Halperin et al9 demonstrated the vulnerabilities of such 
devices, which is detrimental to their safe operation, and the 
availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the associated 
data. This study highlighted the tensions between safety and 
security while emphasizing the complexity of skills from the 
medical, technical, and security disciplines that are required 
to evaluate security risk and contribute to the protection of 
such devices. The connection of unconventional peripherals 
such as cardiac tissue connected to an electrical stimulation 
device illustrates this complexity. To date, research into 
security vulnerabilities has focused on Type 1 devices9–13 
such as implantable medical devices, where the greatest 
concerns reside with respect to patient safety adverse events. 
It should be noted that when assessing risk (eg, in Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission [IEC] 62304) embedded 
software is classified further into levels of potential harm 
from failure of the device or software.
The increased use of wireless network connectivity 
and connection of devices to the Internet, coupled with 
the desire to make use of the information collected on a 
medical device in other health systems, has made medical 
devices more open and subsequently vulnerable to cyber-
security threats. It is important to note that vulnerabilities 
were always inherent in these devices, and that it is the 
exposure to a greater threat landscape, through these network 
connections, that is responsible for the increased risk. 
Thus, the responsibility for maintaining device functionality, 
integrity and confidentiality of information, patient privacy, 
device and information availability, to prevent adverse effect 
on patient safety is now shared by manufacturers, health care 
providers, and patients.4
Cybersecurity incidents
The once seemingly futuristic exploit of implanted medical 
devices has been made present with the demonstration of 
successful attacks against devices such as the insulin pump14 
and pacemakers.15,16 Research from the Archimedes – Ann 
Arbor Research Center for Medical Device Security at the 
University of Michigan has demonstrated the potential 
compromise to implanted devices.17 The lack of device 
embedded security controls is of greater concern than the 
incidents they result in. Research has demonstrated that 
issues such as web interfaces to infusion pumps, default 
hard coded administration passwords, access to the Internet 
through devices connected to internal networks, are just a 
few of the common vulnerabilities found in devices used in 
the hospital environment.18 Embedded web services, with 
unauthenticated and unencrypted communication are one 
of the biggest vulnerabilities, as an attacker can potentially 
affect these devices remotely from anywhere in the world.
Incidents such as a malware attack that infected US 
Department of Veterans Affairs medical devices running over 
a trusted network, has led to an isolation approach to protec-
tion (for some 50,000 medical devices), thereby defeating the 
point of interoperability and connectivity.19 Such incidents, 
together with the national Ponemon and SANS research 
reports, prompted the US Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to investigate health care as a potential high profile 
risk, and issued a private industry notification (FBI case no 
140408-010). This stated that:
Cyber actors will likely increase cyber intrusions against 
health care systems – to include medical devices – due to 
mandatory transition from paper to electronic health records 
(EHR), lax cybersecurity standards, and a higher financial 
payout for medical records in the black market.20
Recognition of the increasing vulnerability of medical 
networks, as well as medical devices connected to these 
networks, is reflected in the revisions to the international 
standard International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO)/IEC 27000-series “Information security manage-
ment systems” and ISO/IEC 80001 “Application of risk 
management for IT networks incorporating medical 
devices”. However, consideration of the threat to the devices 
themselves and subsequently the resulting patient safety 





concerns are of greater concern when the connections are to 
wireless networks.
What complicates the security risks with medical devices 
is that these devices expose both data/information and 
potentially the control of the device itself. In addition, the 
 cybersecurity discipline tends to take a risk approach to any 
problem. Traditionally security has been viewed as a tech-
nological solution space, and subsequently the change in the 
operating environment driven by technology such as wireless, 
has been focused on controlling the risk with technology. This 
perspective has gradually altered over time with acknowl-
edgment that those practical security solutions in health 
care need to take a socio-technical approach.21 Further, for 
practical security solutions to be effective, research shows 
that they must, at the very least, consider clinical workflow, 
if not seamless integration with this workflow.22
Contention between manufacture  
and regulation
The contention between medical device manufacture 
and regulation is not a new issue. The current discussion 
around the security of medical devices parallels that which 
occurred in critical infrastructure devices over a decade ago.23 
Balancing this contention with innovation, while focusing on 
assuring efficacy and safety can be problematic.24 Rigorous 
clinical trials are not part of the process for approval of all 
devices, and in both the US and the European Union, this 
is handled through pre-market submission and post-market 
surveillance.25 However, this does not consider non-clinical 
safety issues with networked medical devices. The reality is 
the occurrence and reporting of attacks has increased, and 
medical devices are not immune to this.26
The recognition of cybersecurity as a significant vulner-
ability in medical devices has driven guidance, albeit in draft 
mode, by regulatory authorities.27 The most notable being the 
FDA recommendations for managing cybersecurity risks to 
protect the patient and the information contained, created and 
processed by the medical device. Guidance such as “Content 
of pre-market submissions for management of cybersecurity 
in medical devices”4 is aimed at considering protection in the 
design and development stages by identifying potential security 
risks. The major issue with this guidance is that it also recom-
mends that patches and update plans be submitted for review 
to the FDA. In an environment where software patching can be 
an almost daily occurrence, this would be unworkable for the 
certification required by medical device manufacturers. The gap 
in patch application is a result of the multi-step process required 
for medical devices, even without re-certification. If the 
software supplier releases a patch, the device manufacturer has 
to perform the engineering analysis prior to the verification and 
validation. Once released to the health care provider, testing in 
the target environment and an impact analysis on patient safety, 
workflow, scheduling, and patient care is required. The final 
step, which often results in delayed rollouts, is the distribution 
and installation to all devices. High profile instances where 
patches have not been applied, such as the Conficker virus, are 
only the apex of a much larger problem.28
Further, the FDA recommendations are standard across 
any cybersecurity risk-assessment process. The differenti-
ating point is that, to date, medical device manufacturers 
have not had to consider intentional as well as unintentional 
compromise of a device based on cybersecurity vulner-
abilities, and therefore cybersecurity risks have not been 
considered as part of a product’s design. It is unfortunate 
that the evolutionary development of medical devices has 
resulted in software validation as a separate activity in the 
medical device certification process. Indeed, the international 
standard “IEC 62304 Medical device software – Software 
life cycle processes”, to which medical devices must be 
certified, was developed specifically for this purpose. 
However, it does not include network connection or cyber-
security considerations.
It is important to recognize that compliance with 
regulation does not equate to security. Compliance is dem-
onstration against a set of static principles, usually articulated 
in regulation or policy. Security, on the other hand, needs to 
address a dynamic and uncertain environment that is difficult 
to predict, manage, and therefore define for compliance.
A cybersecurity perspective  
on the vulnerabilities
Vulnerability is considered a weakness that may be exploited, 
be it in hardware, software, firmware, operating systems, 
medical devices, networks, people, and processes. All of these 
elements comprise an information system and are critical to 
its functioning. A threat is the potential for a vulnerability 
to be exploited, and the risk is calculated by consideration of 
the likelihood that a threat can occur together with a measure 
of the severity of any potential impact. Mitigation is a risk 
management strategy used to minimize the impact of an 
attack. Intrinsic in the calculation of risk is the outcome of 
an attack, and the aspect of security it affects.
Harm of cybersecurity vulnerability
Information security theory defines the basic goals of security 
protection to be confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
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of information. As such, networked medical devices are 
open to the following:
•	 confidentiality may be compromised from unauthorized 
access due to poor access control measures. The impact 
of this is:
○	 non-compliance with regulations (HIPAA [Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996], 
Australian Privacy Principles),
○	 reputational damage,
○	 litigation and financial consequences.
•	 Integrity may be affected from poor configuration, 
corruption of data, or unauthorized manipulation of 
information. This will impact:
○	 patient safety from potentially incorrect clinical 
decisions,
○	 patient safety from the device being operated by an 
attacker.
•	 Availability where access to data or a device is limited or 
lost. The impact of this on:
○	 patient safety from limiting access to relevant 
critical information and affecting subsequent clinical 
decisions,
○	 patient safety where critical alerts are not received. 
Motivation of attack
To further understand the potential vulnerabilities and assess 
risk, the definition of the cyber threat landscape should be 
considered from both the motivation for attack, and the 
type of attack that is carried out. The motivation factors can 
be defined generally as:
•	 financial (criminals, organized crime, motive for attack 
is to make money),29
•	 nation state (state sponsored, eg, Stuxnet, People’s 
Republic of China cyber-army),30
•	 hacktivist or cyber terrorist (to make a political state-
ment – usually asymmetrical).31
The generic method by which an attacker seeks to attack 
can be broadly defined as methods of attack:
•	 external – local (attacker has physical access to the 
device),
•	 external – remote (attacker has remote access to the 
device),
•	 insider – deliberate (inside attacker deliberately attacks 
the network, can be remote or local),
•	 insider – inadvertent (inserts infected USB stick, 
configuration error by administrator),
•	 inadvertent/random – no specific threat actor involved 
(worm or power failure).
The key security threats, and for which incidents have 
been recorded, includes malware and hacking to cause 
intentional harm. The susceptibility to such incidents has 
prompted the authorities, including the US Department of 
Homeland Security, to investigate the cybersecurity flaws 
in this sector of health care provision.32,33 From a security 
perspective, this is clearly a critical infrastructure protection 
issue. In addition, physical incidents such as theft of devices 
and electromagnetic (EM) interference are present regardless 
of integration into networks, and affects primarily availability, 
and potentially confidentiality.
Network and wireless vulnerabilities
Attacks that use networks as a vector and aim to exploit vul-
nerabilities in computers and devices attached to the network 
are usually aimed at the following three targets: web servers, 
databases, and application software.
1. Web servers. The use of a web service is quite common 
in interfacing with medical devices, providing a graphical 
interface through which to configure or interact with a 
device. The weakness of using such an interface is that 
web services commonly contain vulnerabilities, readily 
exploitable by an attacker. There are many attack tools, 
which are freely available to download and use, which 
scan web interfaces and highlight any vulnerabilities in 
the web service. An attacker can use this information 
to construct a specific payload to attack a vulnerable 
target.
2. Database servers. Many devices and systems have a 
database or data store to retain information for that device, 
commonly referred to as a database back-end. Many of 
these databases run a form of structured query language 
(SQL), and if not configured correctly to sanitize input 
data, are highly vulnerable to SQL injection. An SQL 
injection is a very serious attack, as it degrades all three 
of the goals of information security (confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability). The attacker can delete all 
information in the database, rendering it unavailable. 
They can read all of the information, a breach of confi-
dentiality, and they can inject false data, which is a loss 
of integrity of the data.
3. Application software. This applies to any software 
running on a device, be it in conjunction with either of 
the previous two categories or on its own. This type of 
attack is likely to be successful where software has not 
been through rigorous software vulnerability testing to 
determine what vulnerabilities may be present. Many 
successful cyberattacks have exploited vulnerabilities in 





code not rigorously tested prior to deployment in a live 
environment.
Further to these categories, the method of exploit can be 
direct attack, social engineering, malware, or a combination 
of any of these. Direct attack can be through a direct con-
nection to the device, over either a wireless or a physical 
connection, where the user is in proximity to the device, or 
is able to make a direct connection over a network, locally 
or over the Internet. Social engineering describes that phase 
of an attack where the attacker acquires information from 
people who have knowledge of the system or its security 
measures, such as passwords, by talking, emailing, or imper-
sonation. Most successful attacks contain some element of 
social engineering. The last category is comprised of viruses, 
worms, Trojans, and advanced persistent threat malicious 
software. This software targets, and exploits, known vulner-
abilities in software to gain control of, or corrupt, a system. 
Traditionally, antivirus software is used to mitigate this threat, 
but this has become increasingly ineffective.34
The discrete nature of some medical devices mean they 
cannot be protected using traditional network defenses 
such as firewalls, antivirus, or intrusion detection systems. 
This is because such devices are not permanently connected 
to the wide IT infrastructure; rather they are accessed on an 
ad hoc basis as required. The protective functionality, could 
in theory, be built into these devices; however, this would 
mean a more powerful processor would be required, with a 
corresponding increase in power usage, resulting in reduced 
battery life. The only way to overcome this limitation would 
be to use a larger battery resulting in a larger device. As such, 
they are more vulnerable than similar networked devices, 
and this must be considered as part of the use or deployment 
of these devices.
The use of wireless networks to exchange data and 
information presents significant challenges in achieving the 
security goals of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Wireless networks are fundamentally a radio signal, sent 
between two or more devices, which have been encoded to 
carry information. More specifically, it is an EM wave that 
has been modulated to carry digital data, and as such, it is 
vulnerable to interference from other EM waves. There are 
two significant issues presented by this. Firstly, it means that 
jamming these signals is a trivial exercise, which prevents 
connection to the device and vice versa. Secondly, tracking 
the source of the jamming can be difficult, as can removing 
or stopping this jamming. This type of attack is commonly 
referred to as a denial-of-service attack, and directly affects 
the availability of information. The following devices all use 
EM waves to send and receive information and thus are all 
vulnerable to this type of denial of service: Wi-Fi (Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers [IEEE] 802.11) 
networks, Bluetooth devices (IEEE 802.15), ZigBee devices 
(IEEE 802.15.4), and radio frequency identification devices 
(includes smart cards). In reality, most sources of interference 
are classified as inadvertent because the source of interference 
is usually another such device, which operates on the same 
frequency. Logic would dictate that frequencies are reserved 
for particular devices, which would seemingly eliminate this 
problem. However, these devices operate in so-called license 
free bands, and as such operate under a public park policy and 
reservation of frequencies or channels is not allowed.
There are also issues that make achieving the goals of the 
integrity and confidentiality of the data a challenging task. 
Interception of data exchanged between an insulin pump and 
a connected device is not usually a particularly high risk, 
although this affects confidentiality through eavesdropping. 
This data, if revealed to a third party, is not likely to result in 
any particular patient safety issue, although confidentiality 
may be compromised. However, integrity is crucial, and this 
is particularly challenging when using a wireless connection. 
As the mechanism of transfer is a radio wave signal, this signal 
cannot only be intercepted, but an attacker can send his or her 
own signal. This is referred to as a man-in-the-middle attack. 
This type of injection is extremely high risk, as an attacker could 
reprogram a device to operate in a manner that could severely 
affect patient safety. Certain protocols, such as the IEEE 802.11 
contain mitigations and preventions for such attacks, but these 
protections are optional, and it is up to the manufacturer to 
have considered these risks and implemented these protections. 
Frequently, such attacks are not considered by engineers, who 
are concerned primarily with the continued operation and 
functionality of the device within normal parameters.
why are medical devices open to these 
vulnerabilities?
A number of factors complicate protection of medical devices, 
and contribute to a continued state of insecurity. These are a 
result of technical, management and human causes.
•	 Providing hackers with vital information: certification 
agencies publish device verification information, such 
as spectrum; radio frequency transmission data are pub-
lished in device manuals; and the device workings are 
available on patent databases. It is a misconception to 
depend on security through obscurity even where pro-
prietary protocols are used for communication. Not only 
does this limit interoperability, but it also leaves a gap 
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for reverse engineering from which little protection can 
be applied.13 Using sound and proven cybersecurity 
approaches provides better protection.
•	 Legacy operating systems and software (typically devices, 
systems, and software that is over 5 years old or has 
been replaced by a new version), and incompatibility 
between systems leaves vulnerabilities such as miscon-
figuration and security holes. This includes vulnerabilities 
from non-negotiated interfaces with third party software, 
often through web interfaces.35
•	 Lack of timely software updates and patches. This is 
often an issue where concerns with workflow and service 
disruptions are present. Although health care providers, 
such as the US Veteran Affairs, have considered improved 
patch management,36 this will remain an ongoing issue in 
settings where large numbers of devices are used and are 
a constituent part of other clinical information systems.
•	 Medical devices do not have basic security features. 
For instance, computed tomography scanners delivering 
measured radiation can be tampered with, potentially 
creating life threatening patient safety issues. Security 
features added after design, sometimes at implementa-
tion, can disrupt clinical workflow and are implemented 
poorly.
•	 Web services are a popular solution for interfacing to 
existing systems. For instance where increased interop-
erability with EMR systems is required, these are 
insecurely implemented (with insecure authentication 
and unencrypted). This means that information can be 
modified as it is transferred to EMR systems. With the 
increasing reliance on information presented in electronic 
information systems, the integrity of information in health 
care is vital.
•	 Compromised medical devices can be used to attack 
other sections of the health care organization network. 
The demand for interoperability and seamless integration 
between systems, networks, and devices increases the risk 
for cybersecurity breaches.
•	 Lack of awareness of the cybersecurity issues, and poor 
security practices compound the underlying problem of 
mixed cybersecurity programs in device development 
and certification. These poor practices include lack of 
secure disposal of devices containing information or 
data, password sharing, and distribution of passwords 
particularly in devices where passwords are required 
for device access. Inconsistent education and training 
on cybersecurity risks and impacts also underpin the 
continued cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
•	 Achieving a balance between security and privacy goals 
and health care utility and safety can be challenging. 
For instance, using strong encryption and access control 
measures enhance security, but place the patient at greater 
risk in the case of an emergency.37
•	 Limited power and resources of medical devices mean that 
encryption can slow down medical devices, and reduce 
the usable battery life.
These issues highlight the complexity in the control 
and management of cybersecurity risk and contribute to 
the overall lack of security seen in the health care field 
currently.
Solution space and its challenges
The solutions space for the range of vulnerabilities discussed 
is as multifacetted as the issues themselves. This section 
details the guidance that can be used to devise suitable pro-
tection mechanisms, mitigations, and processes. The aspects 
include information security processes, reporting and 
feedback loops, risk management, regulation, resilience 
activities, and standards, as well as best practice technical 
controls. This challenge is made more complex with the 
propagation of device functionality. This evolving nature of 
security threats means that some of the security challenges 
with networked medical devices are as yet unknown.38
information security processes
Selecting and implementing information security processes is 
further complicated where there are multiple manufacturers 
of devices and equipment in the physical network, as well 
as the logical clinical workflow. While interoperability may 
be achieved, this does not mean that it is secure interoper-
ability because of the number and diversity of the devices, 
equipment, and platforms being connected. The secure con-
figuration of the network and attached devices, together with 
the subsequent coordination required for patch management 
(software updating) is a major confounding factor.
Reporting and feedback loops
Good feedback and notification systems are required between 
health care providers and medical device manufacturers, to 
ensure effective mitigation of potential cybersecurity issues. 
In addition, legislation to mandate reporting of cybersecurity 
incidents would assist in identifying issues from all health 
care providers. This would require a greater understanding 
by the regulatory bodies to distinguish between a patient 
safety incident and a cybersecurity incident. Unfortunately, 
cybersecurity incidents are currently only categorized as 





safety issues where they result in an identifiable detrimental 
patient safety outcome.
Auditing, including network and access monitoring 
specifically where medical devices are used, should become 
part of normal operational practice, and reportable to the 
governance level of the organization. A lack of reporting, 
and even recognition, of security breaches creates an added 
challenge in that not all errors, malfunctions, security 
incidents, and information leaks are identified, or reported 
immediately. The consistency with which post-market sur-
veillance identifies security and privacy issues is marginal 
at best.10 This reveals that collecting data on cybersecurity 
events, when not identifiably and directly linked to patient 
adverse events, or recalls of devices, is highly problematic.
Risk management
Processes, procedures, and robust governance mean that risk 
identification and understanding risk management factors 
and incident response are essential. This is in addition to 
the regulatory compliance required for patient safety. Risk 
management and governance processes should include docu-
menting data flows with regard to networked medical devices. 
This would ensure that appropriate protection is provided at 
each stage of data transfer, processing, and storage. Such 
management has to be defined by organizational policy, 
and supported with appropriate procedures. The evolution 
of medical devices and their proliferation has hampered 
timely and effective cyber threat mitigation controls. The 
volume of devices in a health care organization that can be 
networked creates multiple points of vulnerability. While, 
these should be identified through the risk management 
process, the reality is that risk management frameworks do 
not yet include the use of medical devices, or their associated 
vulnerabilities. This issue is understandable from an evolu-
tionary perspective as in most hospitals, medical devices are 
managed by the biomedical technicians, while the IT network 
is under the  auspices of the IT department. Added to this is 
the acknowledged factor that an IT person is not a security 
specialist. A specialist in cybersecurity has to have the abil-
ity to recognize complex and emergent behavior and provide 
appropriate responses to new cybersecurity threats.39
Regulation
The requirement for renewed FDA approval when any 
changes are made to a medical device, including the 
embedded software, means additional cost and time to 
market. This leaves known vulnerabilities open longer than 
would otherwise occur, and imposes additional cost to the 
manufacturer in the regulatory compliance process. Further, 
the regulatory bodies are concerned with the security of 
the device and not of the embedded code, which may have 
inherent security vulnerabilities. The FDA Safety and Inno-
vation Act (FDASIA) report identified that with the increase 
in data exchange between devices and EMR systems, and 
the use of the wireless spectrum, that the FDA needed to be 
clearer in its aspects of regulation that will apply to cyber-
security vulnerabilities.5
Resilience activities and contingency 
planning
Network segregation, particularly for legacy devices, is a 
sound resilience and protection measure. This may include set-
ting up virtual local area networks, firewalls, limiting access, 
and the use of uninterruptible power supplies on critical care 
devices. All of these measures are a standard part of contin-
gency planning, but, similar to risk assessment, have not fully 
considered medical devices to be part of the information sys-
tem network. Contingency planning for information systems 
is comprised of business impact analysis, incident detection 
and response, disaster recovery, and business continuity.40 
This plan documents pre-defined processes, providing a gov-
ernance approach to system resilience, as well as handling and 
recovering from incidents. In the adoption of a governance 
approach, the three levels of organizational structure all play 
a role in the protection of resources including the medical 
devices and associated networked technologies. At the stra-
tegic level, compliance with regulation, policy development, 
and business process are the culmination of the lower level 
activity. From the tactical perspective, proactive approaches to 
risk management, auditing, education, and contingency plan-
ning are needed. At the day-to-day operational level, everyday 
practices such as implementing technical controls (eg, encryp-
tion) routinely and using processes integrated seamlessly into 
workflow can ensure that mitigations are effective.
Standards
Standards provide good practice yet need application and 
interpretation. While there are a number of international stan-
dards that are pre-requisites for the certification of medical 
devices, these are limited to the development and design 
risk assessment process. These standards do not focus on 
the specificity required for cybersecurity within the complex 
deployment setting. However, since many security flaws and 
subsequent vulnerabilities are a consequence of poor software 
design, which may include medical device software, the 
standards related to this are included in the list below. Poor 
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software design and testing can result in application software 
vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and buffer overflow 
attacks. The design aspects in 62304/82304/80002 are key 
to cybersecurity protection, and hence have been included 
in the list. These standards include:
•	 ISO/IEC 27032:2012 Information technology – Security 
techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity standard pro-
vides guidance on addressing cybersecurity issues and 
its relationship to other types of security to highlight the 
basic practices in cybersecurity.
•	 IEC 62304:2006 – Medical device software – software 
life cycle processes define the medical device software 
lifecycle requirements. This standard is currently under 
revision and harmonization with ISO 82304.
•	 IEC/ISO CD 82304 Health software – Part 1: General 
requirements for product safety (under development) 
is a standard for the safety of health software, and an 
evolution of IEC 62304. This standard provides require-
ments for the safety of health software products, and while 
situations where health software is part of – or embedded 
in – a physical device are not part of this standard, where 
medical devices are software only, this standard should 
be used. Both 82304 and 62304 focus on the process of 
product design, software validation and testing. These 
form important guidance since it is reported that software 
failures result in 24% of all medical device recalls.41
•	 ISO/IEC 80001 series of standards detail guidance for 
Application of risk management for IT-networks incor-
porating medical devices.
•	 ISO/DTR 80002-2 Medical device software – Part 2: 
Validation of software for regulated processes is a techni-
cal report under development, which considers embedded 
and associated software with all medical devices.
•	 IEC/TR 80002-1:2009 Medical device software – Part 1: 
Guidance on the application of ISO 14971 to medical 
device software. This provides the risk management 
practitioner advice on meeting the requirements of ISO 
14971, and is used as the principal standard for risk 
management regulation.
•	 IEC/TR 80002-3:2014 Medical device software – Part 3: 
Process reference model of medical device software life 
cycle processes (IEC 62304). This provides the descrip-
tion of the software life cycle processes and the associated 
safety class definitions, derived from IEC 62304.
These standards, while providing good practice in risk and 
development lifecycle processes, do not deal with the funda-
mental cybersecurity protection required in the environment 
of use for medical devices. While SaMD  cannot be ignored, 
it is not discussed in detail in this paper. The development 
of SaMD regulation and standards is under development, yet 
take an identical approach to protection, through risk assess-
ment in the software development lifecycle. The existing 
medical device manufacturers rather than software developers 
have driven this direction. Indeed, development of ISO 82304 
has included robust discussion to obtain shared perspectives 
on the definition of stand-alone health software.
Best practice technical controls
A diverse range of best practice technical controls is available 
for protection from cybersecurity vulnerabilities. However, 
it is the secure application of the controls, within a complex 
system, that remains the challenge. For instance, encryption and 
passwords are standard protection mechanisms, and identifying 
which medical devices are not employing the mechanisms is 
important. Further, proximity-based access control and distance 
bounding may be suitable solutions to the vulnerabilities of 
remote access and insecure web interfaces, but are not com-
monly used. Data leakage detection, prevention, and monitoring 
embedded into information management systems can aid in 
instances where sensitive information is concerned. Software 
for data leakage prevention is available that can undertake this 
activity, yet it is dependent on comprehensive organizational 
policy definition and configuration. Clearly, such measures have 
to be part of an enterprise solution and are not, of themselves, a 
solution to the whole gamut of cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Further, there are difficulties in using standard cyber-
security vulnerability detection products, such as network 
scanning tools, because medical devices, in particular older 
devices running proprietary operating systems, are not 
recognizable by such tools. Conversely networked medical 
devices running on standard operating systems are susceptible 
to the same vulnerabilities as other standard IT networks. 
A lack of access by cybersecurity practitioners to the real-
world devices, particularly implanted medical devices, for 
testing and experimentation creates another potential failure 
in effective protection. This coupled with the lack of collabora-
tion between the disparate disciplines required to address the 
biomedical-security challenges, creates further complexity.37 
Medical device manufacturers will need to have additional 
expertise in medical networks both wired and wireless, and 
work closely with health care providers and organizations to 
both understand and mitigate potential threats.
It is not possible to view the solution space for medical 
device cybersecurity protection in isolation of the systems 
they connect to, and the environment in which they operate. 
Clear definition of the responsibility for the infrastructure, 





patching, operating systems, policy development as well as 
monitoring and resolution of incidents, is required.
Conclusion
In the health care setting, patient safety will always come 
before cybersecurity requirements. The challenge is to 
close the gap between the two objectives, minimizing 
compromise and ensuring patient safety, while being 
responsive to the evolving cybersecurity threat environment. 
Medical devices are now an integral component of medical 
networks and therefore their security should be an integral 
component of cybersecurity protection. This will require 
increased collaboration between the medical physicists and 
IT professionals, as well as collaboration by medical device 
manufacturers and network vendors, and may require input 
from cybersecurity experts.
The cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are associated with 
medical devices are similar to any other networked system. 
What delineates the medical device environment from other 
networked environments is the potential detrimental impact 
on patient safety that exploitation of cybersecurity vulner-
abilities may have. To shift the protection of medical devices 
to more mainstream cybersecurity protection will require 
the acceptance of medical devices as standard connections 
in the implementation of a network. This shift is essential, 
given the current lack of governance of networked medical 
devices, together with limited risk management, reliance on 
medical device regulatory approval, lack of awareness of the 
actual security risks, and lack of preparation by organizations 
to deal with the risks. While jurisdictional legislation has 
been the driver in the US to enforce increased protection, 
through the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, the HITECH 
(Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health) Act, and linkage to funding through the Meaningful 
Use 2 and 3, this compliance does not mean effective security. 
Data breach legislation and mandatory reporting has resulted 
in a proactive decreed approach to promoting a more cyber-
security aware health care environment, however, such an 
approach has been slow to be adopted outside of the US.
There is little argument that controlling cybersecurity in 
evolving and expanding medical networks, inclusive of medi-
cal devices, is a significant challenge. The first step in tackling 
the challenge is for health care organizations to understand 
the cybersecurity vulnerabilities that are already present 
in their networked medical devices, including the potential 
exposure of sensitive information and the associated privacy 
issues. The second step is to embed cybersecurity protection 
into the design and development processes of medical device 
manufacture. Standards revision and new national guidance is 
currently addressing this objective. The third step is to estab-
lish accountability for medical device cybersecurity, using 
standards, to assist manufacturers and implementers, together 
with regulatory oversight to ensure compliance. Finally, 
medical device industry advocacy must assist in promoting 
increased awareness of cybersecurity and privacy issues.
To ensure the future protection of medical devices in a net-
worked world, a coordinated proactive approach that includes 
standard cybersecurity assessment and control, together with 
specific medical device data and workflow considerations, is 
needed. In the interim, there will inevitably be adverse outcomes 
for patient safety while a clear, workable process is developed, 
awareness of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices 
is enhanced, and a shift in perception is implemented.
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